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PPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO
09/502,565	02/11/2000	Timothy S. Farlow	12579-002001	5344
26161	7590 11/03/2004		EXAMINER	
FISH & RICHARDSON PC			STARKS. W	ILBERT L
225 FRANKLIN ST BOSTON, MA 02110			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			2121	

DATE MAILED: 11/03/2004

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

	Application No.	Applicant(s)					
	09/502,565	FARLOW, TIMOTHY S.					
Office Action Summary	Examiner	Art Unit					
	Wilbert L. Starks, Jr.	2121					
The MAILING DATE of this communication ap	pears on the cover sheet with the c	orrespondence address					
A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPL THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION. - Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1. after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication. - If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a rep. If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statut Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailine earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).	136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the cause the application to become ABANDONE	nely filed s will be considered timely. the mailing date of this communication. D (35 U.S.C. § 133).					
Status							
1) Responsive to communication(s) filed on 09 A	<u> August 2004</u> .						
2a) This action is FINAL . 2b) ☑ Thi	s action is non-final.						
,—	Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under <i>Ex parte Quayle</i> , 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.						
Disposition of Claims							
4) ☐ Claim(s) 1-86 is/are pending in the application 4a) Of the above claim(s) is/are withdra 5) ☐ Claim(s) is/are allowed. 6) ☐ Claim(s) 1-86 is/are rejected. 7) ☐ Claim(s) is/are objected to. 8) ☐ Claim(s) are subject to restriction and/or	awn from consideration.						
Application Papers							
9) The specification is objected to by the Examin 10) The drawing(s) filed on is/are: a) accomposition and accomposition and accomposition are accomposed as a specific and accomposition are accomposed as a specific and accomposition are accomposed as a specific accomposition accomposition are accomposed as a specific accomposition accom	cepted or b) objected to by the lead rawing(s) be held in abeyance. See ction is required if the drawing(s) is obj	e 37 CFR 1.85(a). jected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).					
Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119							
12) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign a) All b) Some * c) None of: 1. Certified copies of the priority document 2. Certified copies of the priority document 3. Copies of the certified copies of the priority document application from the International Bureat * See the attached detailed Office action for a list	nts have been received. Its have been received in Applicationity documents have been received au (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).	on No ed in this National Stage					
Attachment(s)							
 Notice of References Cited (PTO-892) Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948) Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08 Paper No(s)/Mail Date 	4) Interview Summary Paper No(s)/Mail Da 5) Notice of Informal P 6) Other:						

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DETAILED ACTION

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101

1. 35 U.S.C. §101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

the invention as disclosed in claims 1-86 is directed to non-statutory subject matter.

2. Claims 1-86 are not claimed to be practiced on a computer, therefore, it is clear that the claims are not limited to practice in the technological arts. On that basis alone, they are clearly nonstatutory.

3. Regardless of whether any of the claims are in the technological arts, none of them is limited to practical applications in the technological arts. Examiner finds that *In re Warmerdam*, 33 F.3d 1354, 31 USPQ2d 1754 (Fed. Cir. 1994) controls the 35 USC §101 issues on that point for reasons made clear by the Federal Circuit in *AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.*, 50 USPQ2d 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Specifically, the Federal Circuit held that the act of:

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Examiner finds that Applicant's "knowledge block" references are just such abstract ideas.

4. Examiner bases his position upon guidance provided by the Federal Circuit in *In re Warmerdam*, as interpreted by *AT&T v. Excel*. This set of precedents is within the same line of cases as the *Alappat-State Street Bank* decisions and is in complete agreement with those decisions. *Warmerdam* is consistent with *State Street*'s holding that:

Today we hold that the transformation of data, representing <u>discrete dollar amounts</u>, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation because it produces 'a useful, concrete and tangible result" -- a final share price momentarily fixed for recording purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades. (emphasis added) State Street Bank at 1601.

- 5. True enough, that case later eliminated the "business method exception" in order to show that business methods were not per se nonstatutory, but the court clearly *did not* go so far as to make business methods *per se statutory*. A plain reading of the excerpt above shows that the Court was *very specific* in its definition of the new *practical application*. It would have been much easier for the court to say that "business methods were per se statutory" than it was to define the practical application in the case as "...the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price..."
- 6. The court was being very specific.

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7. Additionally, the court was also careful to specify that the "useful, concrete and tangible result" it found was "a final share price momentarily fixed for recording purposes and even accepted and <u>relied upon</u> by regulatory authorities and in subsequent <u>trades</u>." (i.e. the trading activity is the <u>further practical use</u> of the real world <u>monetary</u> data beyond the transformation in the computer – i.e., "post-processing activity".)

- 8. Applicant cites no such specific results to define a useful, concrete and tangible result. Neither does Applicant specify the associated practical application with the kind of specificity the Federal Circuit used.
- 9. Furthermore, in the case *In re Warmerdam*, the Federal Circuit held that:

...[The dispositive issue for assessing compliance with Section 101 in this case is whether the claim is for a process that goes beyond simply manipulating 'abstract ideas' or 'natural phenomena' ... As the Supreme Court has made clear, '[a]n idea of itself is not patentable, ... taking several abstract ideas and manipulating them together adds nothing to the basic equation. In re Warmerdam 31 USPQ2d at 1759 (emphasis added).

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- 10. Since the Federal Circuit held in *Warmerdam* that this is the "dispositive issue" when it judged the usefulness, concreteness, and tangibility of the claim limitations in that case, Examiner in the present case views this holding as the dispositive issue for determining whether a claim is "useful, concrete, and tangible" in similar cases.

 Accordingly, the Examiner finds that Applicant manipulated a set of abstract "knowledge block" to solve purely algorithmic problems in the abstract (i.e., what *kind* of "knowledge" is used in the block? Algebraic word problems? Boolean logic problems? Fuzzy logic algorithms? Probabilistic word problems? Philosophical ideas? Even vague expressions, about which even reasonable persons could differ as to their meaning? Combinations thereof?) Clearly, a claim for manipulation of "natural language input" is provably even more abstract (and thereby less limited in practical application) than pure "mathematical algorithms" which the Supreme Court has held are per se nonstatutory in fact, it *includes* the expression of nonstatutory mathematical algorithms.
- 11. Since the claims are not limited to <u>exclude</u> such abstractions, the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim limitations <u>includes</u> such abstractions. Therefore, the claims are impermissibly abstract under 35 U.S.C. 101 doctrine.

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12. Since Warmerdam is within the Alappat-State Street Bank line of cases, it takes the same view of "useful, concrete, and tangible" the Federal Circuit applied in State Street Bank. Therefore, under State Street Bank, this could not be a "useful, concrete and tangible result". There is only manipulation of abstract ideas.

13. The Federal Circuit validated the use of *Warmerdam* in its more recent *AT&T*Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc. decision. The Court reminded us that:

Finally, the decision in In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 31 USPQ2d 1754 (Fed. Cir. 1994) is not to the contrary. *** The court found that the claimed process did nothing more than manipulate basic mathematical constructs and concluded that 'taking several abstract ideas and manipulating them together adds nothing to the basic equation'; hence, the court held that the claims were properly rejected under §101 ... Whether one agrees with the court's conclusion on the facts, the holding of the case is a straightforward application of the basic principle that mere laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not within the categories of inventions or discoveries that may be patented under §101. (emphasis added) AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1447, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

- 14. Remember that in *In re Warmerdam*, the Court said that this was the dispositive issue to be considered. In the *AT&T* decision cited above, the Court reaffirms that this is the issue for assessing the "useful, concrete, and tangible" nature of a set of claims under 101 doctrine. Accordingly, Examiner views the *Warmerdam* holding as the dispositive issue in this analogous case.
- 15. The fact that the invention is merely the manipulation of *abstract ideas* is clear. The data referred to by Applicant's phrase "knowledge block" is simply an abstract construct that does not limit the claims to the transformation of real world data (such as monetary data or heart rhythm data) by some disclosed process. Consequently, the necessary conclusion under *AT&T*, *State Street* and *Warmerdam*, is straightforward and

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clear. The claims take several abstract ideas (i.e., "knowledge blocks" in the abstract) and manipulate them together adding nothing to the basic equation. Claims 1-86 are, thereby, rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112

The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claims 1-86 are rejected under 35 USC 112, first paragraph because current case law (and accordingly, the MPEP) require such a rejection if a 101 rejection is given because when Applicant has not in fact disclosed the practical application for the invention, as a matter of law there is no way Applicant could have disclosed *how* to practice the *undisclosed* practical application. This is how the MPEP puts it:

("The how to use prong of section 112 incorporates as a matter of law the requirement of 35 U.S.C. 101 that the specification disclose as a matter of fact a practical utility for the invention.... If the application fails as a matter of fact to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 101, then the application also fails as a matter of law to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to use the invention under 35 U.S.C. § 112."); In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 942, 153 USPQ 48, 53 (CCPA 1967) ("Necessarily, compliance with § 112 requires a description of how to use presently useful inventions, otherwise an applicant would anomalously be required to teach how to use a useless invention."). See, MPEP 2107.01(IV), quoting In re Kirk (emphasis added).

Therefore, claims 1-86 are rejected on this basis.

Conclusion

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This action is NONFINAL.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the Examiner should be directed to Wilbert L. Starks, Jr. whose telephone number is (571) 272-3691.

Alternatively, inquiries may be directed to the following:

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WLS

26 October 2004

Wilbert L. Starks, Jr.
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Primary Examiner
Art Unit 2121

Art Unit 5277 Es. 577.